Transformation To Sustainability:
last revision - June 26, 2006
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United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance  (new window, website)

"The mission of UNPAN - United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance - is to promote the sharing of knowledge, experiences and best practices throughout the world in sound public policies, effective public administration and efficient civil services, through capacity-building and cooperation among the United Nations Member States, with emphasis on south-south cooperation and UNPAN's commitment to integrity and excellence."

earthmodal note: ICT is Information and Communications Technology

Understanding Knowledge Societies: In twenty questions and answers with the Index of Knowledge Societies  (new window, 1.00MB, pdf)
Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Division for Public Administration and Development Management; United Nations, New York, 2005

1. In the process of knowledge development, there are two main assets that can develop ad indefinitum: people (all people everywhere, even “the others” who, like poor people, hitherto have been treated as dangerous deviants) as creative beings and carriers of tacit knowledge2 ; and, information (explicit knowledge3) that triggers people’s creative reflection, leading to the appearance of “new meaning.”

1 The Report adopts the concept of “shared spaces for knowledge creation” that mirrors the theory of ba. Ba has the following characteristics: (1) Self-organization, with its own intention, direction and mission. Participants in a ba must get involved and cannot be mere onlookers. A good ba needs chaos, care and love, as well as intention and direction. (2) An open boundary that allows both cocooning, i.e. developing one’s own context, and openness to other contexts. (3) Transcending the habitual patterns of time, space and self. Ba lets participants share time and space and transcend their own limited perspectives or boundaries. (4) Multi-discipline and multi-viewpoint dialogues. A good ba enables essential dialogues that allow participants to see themselves through one another. The quality of the conversations we create is one of the most important measures of the quality of ba. (5) Equal access to the centre and maximum capacity with minimum conflict. Every participant in a good ba is at the same distance from the centre. However, the centre is not a fixed point. In ba anyone has the potential to be a centre and the centre can change as the context evolves. Ba as a sphere is constantly moving.



2 Tacit knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information and expert insights that provides an individual with a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. Tacit knowledge is information combined with experience, context, interpretation and judgement. It is acquired through one’s own experience or reflections on the experiences of others. It is intangible, without boundaries and dynamic. It is highly personal and hard to formalize, making it difficult to communicate or share with others. Subjective insights, intuitions and hunches all fall into the category of tacit knowledge.
3 Explicit knowledge (information) refers to “justified (true) belief” that is codified in formal, systemic language. It can be combined, stored, retrieved and transmitted with relative ease and through various means, including modern ICT. 4 “New meaning” is the additional value generated by creative processing of the available information by people and measured by greater and/or new applicability/usefulness of the processed information, as compared with the originally available information.

2. The skill to mass-produce knowledge is being brought to fruition in a world that is organized predominantly into market democracies. The social institutions of the currently existing democracies and currently existing markets must allow (or be transformed to allow) limitless development and use in the process of knowledge development of people and information. This poses a challenge as the currently existing democracies feature minorities with narrow encompassing interests5 that are allowed, by lack of genuine participation, to control public power and to channel in a disproportionate way, public resources and developmental opportunities in their own direction. This translates into limited developmental opportunities for many (or most) that happen to be on the other side of the power divide. And, the currently existing markets are addicted to an easy opportunity to split the total cost of the production of many goods and services into two parts. One part (the smaller, the better) is used to calculate the price at which the goods and services are offered on the market. The other one (as large as the producer can get away with) is usually referred to as “negative externalities.”6 The net negative externalities constitute the loss to society as a whole. They translate into limited development opportunities for people and gradually increasing stress on the biosphere. In the post-modern world, in which mass-produced knowledge “to do” offers investment opportunities in products with high risk content, they add a concern about “human safety” and “safety of life” in general to the traditional development agenda that, till now, has been predominantly focused on achieving “high quality” of life.

5 Mancur Olson, in his book, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships (Basic Books, 2000), puts forward a thesis that growth and development in a society depend on the broadness of the encompassing interest represented by those who control public power and are able to direct public resources and developmental opportunities. An autocrat or a tiny controlling minority in a democracy can afford not to be concerned with the damage that their actions bring to the society as a whole. Thus they not only usurp the right to a disproportional share of public resources and developmental opportunities, but as a rule do not bother to organize the society in ways that would help the less powerful groups. As a result, human development suffers, some markets do not exist, and full potential for growth and development is not realized. He writes, “Astonishingly, sometimes [democratic] majorities and especially super-majorities have a sufficiently encompassing interest in society that they will out of pure self-interest, forgo redistribution to themselves and treat the minority as well as they treat themselves. Whenever there is a superencompassing interest, the second invisible hand – the one that guides encompassing interest in the use of coercive power – works in complete accord with the interest of all.”
6 In classical economy, negative externalities are the adverse economic effects that a transaction has on third parties. Under competitive pressure, by definition, the contracting parties cannot take into consideration whatever happens with society or the biosphere (good or bad), even if it is directly related to the contract. They aim at the market-clearing price: the lower the cost reflected in the price, the greater the opportunity for profit. One can change this equation by technological progress or shedding part of the cost “for free.” Economically rational people would always make a determined effort to shift part of the cost to voiceless participants in the economic game – disenfranchised labour and the mute biosphere. This is an addictive opportunity and power helps feed the addiction. If the biosphere has been regaining a voice, for instance by demonstrating the negative effects of global warming, for every advocate of the biosphere, money can buy at least one advocate of unrestricted business activity. If labour unionizes, the global market allows taking work to unregulated labour markets. Mass production of the knowledge “to do” cannot change such mindsets and such behaviour. To the contrary, it offers more opportunities for feeding this addiction by opening new markets that follow new demand. As a result, the pace of building the pressure of “net negative externalities” on people in primary and secondary labour markets, and on the biosphere, may only increase. But nowadays this goes beyond wages below the poverty line, perpetuating poverty, pollution, depleting ozone or causing global warming. Recently, technological innovations have started to provide investors with opportunities to profitably introduce to society, products with very questionable and potentially harmful effects on life – human life and life in general. The currently existing market would not have any incentive to refuse them as long as demand for them exists or could be artificially created. Thus, in the framework of the currently existing market, mass-produced knowledge “to do” can hasten the pace, broaden the scope and sharpen the harm to human development and to the biosphere that is caused by negative externalities. On the other hand, we know that since the mid-19th century technological progress has been proving the anti-capitalist thinkers wrong by raising productivity and thus providing a cushion that allows the system to continue. Till now though, it has been about real incomes and managing the supply of opportunities for human development. This time around, it would be about all that, plus the safety of life. A “silver bullet” of technology is not likely to solve our social and environmental problems. This would require inter alia different mindsets. This would require also markets that go to “rehab” and start to clear at “addiction–clean” levels.
8 The idea of the “liveable state” reflects the belief that the welfare state (national autonomy in social policy) may evolve into a liveable state (national autonomy in maintaining a liveable neighbourhood). In such a state, social institutions would guarantee as a minimum, rule of law; peace; human rights and freedoms; non-discrimination of any kind; a culture of democracy and open political process; credible and competent public administration; a solid social safety net; accessible and affordable education (lifelong learning), health care, ICT infrastructure; a legal and financial environment conducive to private business activities; and a clean natural environment.

. . . . .

4. And finally, deployment of modern ICT in the context of knowledge development allows the addition of the prefix “mass-” to the production, diffusion and utilization of knowledge. However, as illustrated below, in the future, ICT as a means for accelerating production of knowledge is a resource whose impact on this process will diminish and stabilize as a constant. People are the only factor for accelerating the development of knowledge that is not finite and will not become obsolete.
evolution
"The result of this investigation is less than complete due to lack of adequate, comparable data. It is summarized in the Report’s “illustrative” and “experimental” IKS (Index of Knowledge Societies). IKS is a composite index of the three measures: (1) assets; (2) development of assets, i.e. “advancement”; and, (3) “foresightedness” in following a developmental direction, i.e. commitment to high levels of quality and safety of life. It suggests the following:
• In the random sample of 45 countries for which enough data could be gathered, Sweden leads. The top 10 countries are ranked as follows:

iks

"At the same time, being small does not give an automatic advantage, nor is such an advantage assured by wealth. In the key measure of “foresightedness” in development, both countries with high and low GDP per capita are scattered all over the “foresightedness map.” What is more, non-parametric regression7 of the Foresightedness Index results against the GDP per capita suggests that the relationship between GDP and “foresightedness” is non-linear, and when wealth is pushed beyond certain value levels, its harmonic relationship with “smart” growth and development tends to vanish; the additional wealth created beyond that point tends to be associated with negative outcomes for human development or the natural environment, or both. Explaining this phenomenon in detail would most likely require a separate study. However, one can formulate a thesis that if increases in wealth do not go hand-in-hand with increases in equality of wealth distribution, high levels of concentration of wealth may dramatically encourage the narrowing of the encompassing interest that controls the distribution of resources and developmental opportunities in a society."
gdp
Smart Knowledge Society

3. "To be a Smart Knowledge Society (as distinct from a Nominal or Warped Knowledge Society), it is not enough to be rich in main assets and to take care of their development. A new sense of direction in development and a commitment to this new direction must assure high levels of quality and safety of life. Mass production of the knowledge “to do,” piling up technological innovations, and converting them into products and services in the framework of the Knowledge Economy managed by the currently existing market does not by itself assure high levels of quality and safety of life for all people everywhere. The new direction in development can be formulated on the basis of using the techniques and means to mass-produce knowledge to turn out and apply the knowledge “to be,” to co-exist” and “to maintain developmental equilibrium.”

smart

Main thought:
To be a Smart Knowledge Society, it is not enough to be rich in main assets and to take care of their development. A new sense of direction in development and acommitment to this new direction must assure high levels of …


... quality of life and …
 … safety of life.
Origins of the main thought: Mass production of the knowledge “to do”; piling up technological innovations; and converting them into products and services in the framework of the Knowledge Economy managed by the currently existing market does not by itself assure high levels of quality and safety of life for all people every where.
*

The new direction in development can be formulated on the basis of using the technique and means to mass-produce knowledge to turn out and apply the knowledge “to be,” to co-exist” and “to maintain developmental equilibrium.”
What to watch? • “ Liveable states”
• Culture industry
• Locus of decisions about well-being of mankind
• Agenda for R&D
• Practical uses of the knowledge “to do”
• Dialogue on the knowledge “to be”
• Principles that govern the moral code for making choices and taking decisions
• The fate of the value of human solidarity
• Dialogue on the global unifying central cultural thought for humanity
• Development of people as citizens
• Evolution of the social institution of democracy
• Evolution of the social institution of the market




Proxy measurements
suggested by the Report:
• GINI In d e x
• Child mortality
• CO2 emissions
• Protected areas

definition:    GINI INDEX OF INCOME INEQUALITY

earthmodal  note: the GINI coefficient is explained in detail in document "Global Scenario Group Futures: Technical Notes" which is downloaded in Scenarios (above ) --  section GSG. The component items of "What to watch?" in the table above are discussed in part in Worldviews' Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, particularly Chapter 11 - Ethical, Moral and Religious Concerns. The notions listed are really quite profound and as such require some contemplation. Even a little understanding, however, expands and redirects attention to those values which are of great importance to success in sustainability, and in earthmodal's opinion focus in this area is really worthwhile.
Source
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
  (new window, website)


UNESCO WORLD REPORT
Towards Knowledge Societies  (new window, 4.81 MB, pdf)
Published in 2005 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
Book Design and layout by Roberto C. Rossi Cover design by Maro Haas
Quick glace at the Table of Contents  (new window, html, this site)

Does the aim of building knowledge societies make any sense when history and anthropology teach us that since ancient times, all societies have probably been, each in its own way, knowledge societies?
    Today, as in the past, the control of knowledge can go hand in hand with serious inequality, exclusion and social conflict. Knowledge was long the exclusive domain of tight circles of wise men and the initiated few. Secrecy was the organizing principle behind these exclusive knowledge societies. In the Age of Enlightenment, the demand for democracy, the concept of openness and the gradual emergence of a public forum for knowledge, fostered the spread of the ideas of universality, liberty and equality. The diffusion of knowledge through books and the printing press, as well as the extension of an education for all through schools and universities, accompanied this historical development. But the ideal of a public knowledge forum, which is the basis of UNESCO and of its Constitution, cannot be taken for granted.
    The current spread of new technologies and the emergence of the internet as a public network seem to be carving out fresh opportunities to widen this public knowledge forum. Might we now have the means to achieve equal and universal access to knowledge, and genuine sharing? This should be the cornerstone of true knowledge societies, which are a source of human and sustainable development.

Source
Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC, the Centre)
generates and applies new knowledge to address problems in developing countries.

HUMAN SECURITY AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY
The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment
(2nd edition); Jorge Nef; IDRC 1999; ISBN 0-88936-879-1; 140 pp.

The concept of a world system

A useful heuristic device to help one understand the present crises in their context is the notion of a world system (Cox 1978; Galtung 1980; Wallerstein 1980). This construct encompasses historical, structural, and functional features that make it possible to analyze and reassess changing global conjunctures, irrespective of the type of polarity found in the system. A world system is the type of dominant and integrated pattern of global production, distribution, and power that had its foundations in the 17th century and has expanded and consolidated in the last two centuries (Wallerstein 1980; Bergesen 1983). It involves an unequal and asymmetrical exchange between a developed core and underdeveloped semiperipheries and peripheries, in which systemic and subsystemic development and underdevelopment are functionally and historically, but not deterministically, interrelated.

Core, centres, and peripheries

Despite the use of geographical and spatial concepts, relations in the present system are not so much those between territorially defined centres and peripheries (nations, regions, or settlements) as among concrete social actors: groups, classes, and individuals living in the North or the South. Core and centre are distinct concepts. The core comprises elite socioeconomic groups already transnationally integrated. The centre comprises the developed geographical regions, which contain, as do peripheral regions, their own elite core and a nonelite social periphery. Development and underdevelopment are conditions experienced by people, not abstract aggregations that define the totality of a territory. The idea of developed and underdeveloped nations, First and Third worlds, North and South, obscures the fact that in any society a significant degree of transnational integration occurs among its dominant groups, as well as the effective marginalization of the bulk of its people. As an historical model, the notion of a world system avoids the more simplistic and often mechanistic applications of international-stratification and dependency theories and for that matter the neofunctional fallacy of global and complex interdependency. It also looks at the underlying logic that links cores, semiperipheries, and peripheries as parts of a single structure and process, both at present and in the wider historical perspective.

Regimes

A world system presupposes the existence of regimes, or mechanisms of governance with structures of decision-making, rules, and influence (Keohane and Nye 1975; Hopkins and Puchala 1978). Unlike institutions or “international organizations,” which presuppose the existence of differentiated, formally sanctioned norms and mechanisms of governance, regimes constitute the actually existing arrangements for handling a particular cluster of issues. Regimes are subsystems of the larger global system. Some are highly institutionalized, have clear boundaries, and enjoy a notable degree of concentricity. Others are loose and without a recognizable authority structure. Regimes also vary considerably in terms of how effectively they manage the issues in their areas of concern. I examine regimes in more detail in subsequent chapters.

Power and governance

One important empirical aspect of the analysis of regimes is ascertaining who governs, as real power structures are often neither formalized nor transparent. Power, understood as the ability of one actor or cluster of actors to induce compliant behaviour in others (Dahl 1970), is therefore the very essence of the global system and its constituent regimes. So is powerlessness. But such ability and inability are essentially dynamic and multidimensional. For one thing, power entails a fluid and changing relationship between ends (what for) and means (with what) and is much more than the sum of the resource capabilities, or even possible resource commitments, of an actor or an alliance. In the last analysis, effective power can only be assessed in terms of outcomes vis-à-vis objectives pursued and resources used. In this sense, authority in the Weberian sense of legitimated power (Weber 1947) requiring minimal amounts of coercion (or conversely, rewards) is an efficient and effective element in regime governance. Governance essentially involves both the government’s and the governed’s having the ability to manage conflict with limited use of violence or coercion.

Power and metapower

A second important aspect in the analysis of regimes is drawing the distinction between power and relational control, or metapower (Baumgartner el al. 1977). The latter is the ability to affect the outcome of decisions, nondecisions, actions, and inactions in a given regime by altering the rules of the game. Metapower can be associated with three fundamental concepts representing diverse intellectual traditions in political analysis. One is the above-mentioned idea of legitimation on grounds of tradition, charisma, or legal–rational calculation, as developed by Weber; the second is Gramsci’s notion of hegemony (Cox 1978); and the third is Crozier’s (1964) observation regarding the relationship between power and uncertainty. Very few actors at any given time possess legitimacy, can articulate hegemonic discourses, or have established control over the sources of uncertainty. More often than not, those who can affect the outcome of an interaction, both within specific functional or regional regimes and in the global system, are elite sectors within the core.


Table 1. The global system.


 

Ecology
(life)

Economy
(wealth)

Society 
(support of well-being, affection, respect, rectitude)

Polity
(power)

Culture
(knowledge, skill)


Context

Natural setting (biophysical surroundings of social action)

Styles of development (economic models)

Social expectations and traditions

Internal and external conflicts (capabilities and expectations of the elite and the masses; sovereignty and dependence)

Images of the physical and social world and collective experiences

Culture

Ecoculture (place of environment in cosmovision)

Economic doctrines (ways of understanding the economy)

Social doctrines (values, norms, attitudes; identity and modal personality)

Ideologies (function of the state and its relation to the citizen)

Philosophy (axiologies, teleologies, deontologies); moral and ethical codes

Structures

Resource endowment and spatial distribution (relation between environment and resources)

Economic units (consumers and producers; labour and capital)

Status and roles (social structures, groups, classes, fractions)

Brokers and institutions (interest groups, parties, cliques, governments, bureaucracies)

Formal and informal educational structures (schools, universities, learning institutions)

Processes

Depletion or regeneration of air, water, land, flora, and fauna

Production and distribution of goods and services

Interactions (cooperation, conflict, mobilization, demobilization)

Conflict resolution (consensus, repression, rebellion, stalemate)

Learning (building of consciousness, cognitions, basic values, procedures, teleologies)

Effects

Sustainability or entropy

Prosperity or poverty

Equity or inequity

Governance or violence

Enlightenment or ignorance


The dynamics of the system involves the actions and interactions (Holsti 1972) of actors pursuing goals and using resources in  — as well as having effects on  — a given context and the system’s internal configuration. Changing circumstances, in turn, generate feedback. Dysfunctions produced at the dominant core end up not only having negative impacts on subordinate actors but also generating a delayed and secondary reaction from the centre itself. Conversely, cumulative dysfunctions in the periphery are bound to flow upstream, increasing the uncertainty and instability of the centre and the entire system of global relations. In this sense, contrary to commonly held belief, an increasingly integrated world is also one of mutually assured vulnerability. More than a “zero-sum” game (Deutsch 1968), the possibility of the opposite of the prisoner’s dilemma confronts us  — a negative-score game in which all the players stand to lose.


operations note: place document in the.. /mea/new directory
Ecosystems & Human Well-Being: Volume 3: Policy Responses  (new window, 992KB, pdf)
findings of the Responses Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment / edited by Kanchan Chopra . . . [et al.].
(The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment series ; v. 3)

Chapter 15 Integrated Responses



Figure 15.1
. The Ecosystem Approach. The ecosystem approach contains the above elements, although it is not limited to them. The operational implementation of the ecosystem approach foresees the implementation of all principles together. Its application should be adapted to specific situations and frame conditions. (CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 2003; Ecosystem Approach Annex 1)

Main Messages

Integrated responses intentionally and actively address ecosystem services and human well-being simultaneously. They are gaining in importance in both developing and industrial countries, albeit with mixed results. Although many integrated responses make ambitious claims about their likely benefits, in practice the results of implementation have been varied in terms of ecological, social, and economic impacts.

Integrated responses are closely allied to the concept and implementation of sustainable development.
The interrelationship between ecological, economic, and social systems and the motivation to bring them together in policy and other interventions links the two.

Trade-offs and synergies are central to the development of integrated responses.
Integrated responses seek to explicitly manage trade-offs and to identify positive and negative synergies between different objectives and between ecosystem services and human well-being.

Integrated responses occur at international, national, and sub-national levels
. Examples at the international level include some multilateral environmental agreements, and international agreements such as the Rio Conventions. Policy integration is a growing feature of many national governments. This is evidenced through national strategies for sustainable development and many other initiatives. Integrated responses are perhaps more usually associated with sub-national and local programs, including multisectoral approaches such as integrated coastal zone management and integrated river basin management.

Many integrated responses occur simultaneously at multiple levels.
Integrated responses may be ‘‘nested’’ within different discrete levels, for example, the embedding of Local Agenda 21 within national strategies for sustainable development, developed under the overall framework of Agenda 21. Integrated responses may also be of a multiple scale, and not related to distinct government or administrative levels, but to geographical units such as a watershed or a transboundary marine ecosystem.

Scale issues are critical in integrated responses, and cross-scale responses are necessary.
Integrated responses are often deemed successful at a small-scale, or in a particular locality. However, their effectiveness is limited when constraints are encountered at higher levels, such as in legal frameworks and in government institutions. There appear to be limits to scaling up, not only because of these higher-level constraints, but also because of so-called ‘‘leakage’’ problems. These occur when interventions at a local level address only direct, rather than indirect, or underlying drivers of change. Examples might be where integrated conservation and development projects cause increased migration into buffer zones, or where a carbon forestry project shifts deforestation to another location. In these cases, the problems of ecosystem degradation are merely shifted from one location to another. Cross-scale responses may be better able to deal with both the higher-level constraints and leakage problems, and simultaneously tackle the regional and national, as well as, local drivers of change. Examples of successful cross-scale responses include some co-management approaches to natural resource management in fisheries and forestry, and multistakeholder policy processes.

Integration is also about getting a wider range of actors involved in policy processes and about different forms of intervention and action. Successfully integrated responses usually include the active participation of key stakeholders.
Increasingly, they are associated with the application of multistakeholder processes and with decentralization, and they may include actors and institutions from the government, civil society, and the private sector.

Implementing integrated responses is resource intensive, but the potential benefits can exceed the costs. Integrated responses are inherently complex, often entailing a combination of actions in a range of domains and at different scales. This can be very costly and requires specialized skills and knowledge. For example, the costs of bringing stakeholders to the negotiation table and of employing participatory methodologies in decision-making are often high. However, if decisions command the broad support of stakeholders, they are more likely to be successfully implemented.

Politics plays an important role in integrated responses at all scales.
As integrated responses require bringing together a variety of institutions and individuals with vested interests, and negotiating trade-offs between sectors and actors, collaboration and compromise play a vital role. Successful integrated responses often incorporate conflict resolution mechanisms and deliberative inclusionary processes into their decision-making and management procedures.

Integrated responses do not necessarily bring about more equitable distribution of benefits to stakeholders
. It cannot be assumed that integrated responses are more or less likely to deliver their stated objectives than nonintegrated responses. In most cases integrated responses meet some of their objectives, but not all. Many integrated responses assume that there are synergies between objectives and fail to adequately consider and evaluate tradeoffs. This results in unexpected or unanticipated problems and costs, both to ecosystems and society. Generally, the distribution of benefits is not equitable, and this stems from an inadequate consideration of the social, economic, and political dynamics of society. In a number of cases, the failure to appreciate the heterogeneity of communities, property rights, and access to resources, power, and knowledge of different sectors within society are of critical importance and need to be fully understood.

Integrated responses require multiple instruments for their implementation.
Integrated responses have a complex nature, because of their multiple objectives and often multiscale characteristics. Therefore, a single instrument is rarely adequate to implement them. Market-based and economic instruments are used with increasing frequency in integrated responses, for example, in river basin management and sustainable forest management, but they usually need to be accompanied by other instruments. These are likely to include redistributive measures and property rights adjustments (for example, when setting up new markets) and institutional development and capacity building. Integrated responses, therefore, require a careful coordination of multiple instruments.

Integrated responses are long-term undertakings not short-term projects.
A review of the literature indicates that integrated responses cannot be treated as finite, time-bound projects, nor can they easily be added on to existing policies and interventions. They often require a longer timescale before impacts can be realized or a broad constituency of support can be established. Integrated responses, therefore, should be seen as intrinsic components of long-term changes in environmental governance.

Integrated responses require fundamental shifts in governance institutions in terms of skills, knowledge capacity, and organization.
The experience of many integrated responses shows that the conventional organization of governance institutions militates against successful design and implementation of integrated responses, because the institutions are separated along sectoral lines. This is especially true for government organizations, in both industrial and developing countries, and creates barriers in the transmission of knowledge and information and collaboration across the boundaries of organizations. Within organizations, power and prestige is maintained and conferred by defending knowledge rather than sharing it, resulting in ‘‘turf defending’’ behavior, which needs to change in order to better support integrated responses.

Knowledge gaps are persistent and inhibit integrated responses.
Knowledge gaps are prevalent in several different dimensions and constitute significant constraints to the more widespread successful implementation of integrated responses. Science itself is defined in disciplinary terms, and this undermines more holistic inclusionary approaches to understanding complex social and ecological systems. Furthermore, information needs to be shared and coordinated across disciplines and organizations.

Assessing integrated responses, assessing trade-offs and providing decision support requires multidisciplinary methods and techniques to capture the multiple impacts and assess multiple goals.
Examples of good practice can be found in a number of multidisciplinary techniques such as Multicriteria Analysis. When used collaboratively within a multistakeholder process, these can help in the analysis of trade-offs, reconciliation of conflicts, and development of adaptive management strategies.


operations note: Ecosystems ... is downloaded in Assessment (this site)

Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment

8 Strategic Interventions, Response Options, and Decision-making

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Usable Knowledge

A simplified picture of the role of knowledge in decision-making is shown in Figure 8.1, which portrays three interacting processes: monitoring, the decision-making cycle, and the flow of information to and from stakeholders. Policy-making starts by identifying a problem, then it defines policy options and their choice, formulation, and implementation, and ideally it finishes with monitoring and evaluation of the results of executed actions. The process is interactive and iterative and takes place within a specific institutional structure. At all stages, decisions are based on the values, preferences, intuitions, prejudices, and social situations of the organizations
and individuals who make them. The process engages all “stakeholders,” including effective delivery of essential information to decisionmakers, communication among stakeholders, and multidirectional exchanges among information providers and information users. Measurement assembles information from regular monitoring (the outer cycle in Figure 8.1) and other sources. The identification, analysis, and advocacy of issues all require comprehensive and detailed knowledge of human (socioeconomic) and environmental conditions and major trends, including the nature, distribution, and impact of direct and indirect drivers. Hence they need to draw on accounts, spatial assessments, a comprehensive indicator-based assessment, and sometimes also a science assessment. (See Box 8.1.)



The same tools are required for the analysis of options and the choice of actions or policies. They provide the detailed knowledge necessary to examine which issues to address and in what ways, taking account of feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and the likely impacts of different options on socioeconomic and environmental conditions as well as on particular stakeholders. Policies are implemented through institutions. An institutional analysis is necessary to identify the constraints on implementation and what needs to be done to overcome them. Because implementation depends heavily on the active support and participation of stakeholders, they need to be informed and feedback should be obtained from them at every stage in the decision-making cycle.
Monitoring and indicator-based assessments track implementation, recording:
Failure to implement requires examining whether the policy was correct, the necessary constituency developed, the instruments put in place, and—if all that happened—the instruments were appropriate. If the relevant indicators used by the indicator-based assessment are unlikely to change in time, one or more intermediate or proximate indicators will be needed to establish a causal link between the actions or policies and the intended results in terms of their impacts on ecosystems and human wellbeing. This may be complex, as changes in the state of ecosystems and provisioning of services can be caused by several factors operating simultaneously, such as parallel policies, or by external factors such as changes in economic activities. Also, ecosystems are dynamic by nature, and human-
induced changes cannot always be distinguished from natural ones. Time lags between responses and ecosystem improvement or change can be considerable, and therefore it is important to evaluate impacts on direct and indirect drivers as well.

. . . . .


operations note: A Framework is downloaded in Assessment (this site)

Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment - Chapter 4

4 Drivers of Change in Ecosystems and Their Services

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
. . . . .

There is a substantial literature examining the role of culture in shaping human environmental behavior. It focuses primarily on variations within a nation rather than across nations, in part because it is extremely difficult to establish causal effects of a variable as broad in conceptualization as culture. Two central concerns of the literature are the degree to which the environmentally salient parts of a culture are amenable to change and the degree to which culture actually influences behavior with regard to the environment. There is considerable debate about the first concern. Again, broad generalizations are not warranted, but it is clear that some aspects of culture can change with great rapidity while other elements are inherently conservative.
A substantial body of literature provides lessons on how policies and programs can most effectively produce cultural change around environmental behavior (Dietz and Stern 2002). Obviously, the relationship between culture and behavior is context-specific. Indeed, one important lesson of research on this topic is that overarching generalizations are seldom correct, that the ability of culture to shape behavior depends on the constraints faced by individuals, and that the effects of changing constraints on behavior depend on the culture of the individuals encountering the changes (Gardner and Stern 1995; Guagnano et al. 1995).






Management of Social Transformations (MOST) Programme  (new window, website)

About MOST


"MOST is the only UNESCO programme that fosters and promotes social science research. This places MOST in a pivotal position in the overall promotion of UNESCO's goals.

Background


"The MOST Programme, which is part of the Social and Human Sciences Sector (SHS) of UNESCO, was launched in March 1994. It was designed as a research programme to produce reliable and relevant knowledge for policy makers. The original mandate established a strong commitment to the promotion of research that was comparative, international, interdisciplinary and policy relevant. The programme was also designed to organize and promote international research networks, to give attention to capacity building and to establish a clearing house of knowledge in the social science field."



Democratising Global Governance: The Challenges of the World Social Forum
   (new window, 124KB, pdf)
Francesca Beausang, Management of Social Transformations (MOST), Discussion Paper 59, UNESCO, 2002: (SHS -2002/WS/4)

1 Democracy at the national level: prerequisites to a global democracy


1.1 Civil society as necessary to make democracy work
The above definitions can be contextualised by looking at them in national and global contexts.4 Before discussing the implications of globalization for democracy, it is important to understand what promotes democracy at the national level. In turn, as Putnam would say, “making democracy work” at the national level is partly determined by what happens at the grassroots (see box below).


Two successful grassroots initiatives related by Bunker Roy and Anil Gupta


Bunker Roy’s Barefoot College in Tilonia (India) is the “living example of local people using their own skills to meet their own needs and manage their own resources”. At the College, Barefoot health workers, engineers, accountants and teachers have replaced the urban-based paper qualified professionals. Indeed, experience taught the founders of the College that staff who came from local villages often deferred to urban-educated staff and did not have confidence to express opinions. Also, by excluding urban professionals, they found the solution to the problem of identification of the rural poor, as many of the staff are themselves the rural poor of their villages.
Anil Gupta describes a similar grassroots initiative called the Honey Bee network. Like Roy, Gupta celebrates local initiatives; in addition, Gupta calls for the preservation of ethical capital, as opposed to social capital: Gupta justifies this differentiation on the grounds that “trust and good will also exist among members of the mafia”. However, if one goes by Hirschman’s definition, social capital itself is inherently one of “moral resources”, whose supply increases through use, rather than the opposite, which becomes depleted if not used (quoted in Putnam, 1993). The more two people display trust towards one another, the greater their mutual confidence. It is this ethos that sustains economic dynamism and government performance, according to Putnam, so that the distinction between ethical and social capital might not be as clear as Gupta suggests.


1.2 Political consciousness and social capital
The existence of a political consciousness and social capital is also a pre-requisite of democracy, as emphasized by Sarah Ben Nefissa. She looks at the last presidential and legislative elections in Egypt, which took place in 2000, and analyses voting patterns. She finds that the most important outcome of these elections, which were conducted for the first time under the control of the Supreme Constitutional Court, is that independent candidates seemed to gather most of the votes. She wonders whether this implies the end of politics in Egypt, in that the electorate does not select a party for its programmatic politics, but rather elects a personality, that provides it with the most services. Ben Nefissa mentions another aspect of Egyptian political life, which is that the individual elector still does not exist. Ben Nefissa considers the role of youth to be essential in its emergence. She makes it clear that a requirement of democratisation is that the individual elector become self-conscious and exercises his/her stakeholding power over political processes.
4 For the sake of simplicity and structure, the discussion of local democracy and governance is incorporated to the section on the national level, but it must be clear that the local, national, and global levels are equally important and interdependent determinants of democracy and governance.

1.3 State/civil society
The Egyptian example also implies that the functioning of democracy requires a strong civil society, but a civil society that is politicised, and interacts with the state through concrete participation in decisionmaking processes. It is also important to analyse the political sub-content of civil society organizations. "It is the articulation of goals, power of ideas and efficacy of organizations that will determine [their] political purposes" (Putzel, 1997).
The existence of civil society groups “from below” is not sufficient for democracy to work. In fact, civil society can be “undemocratic” if it is isolated. Different sectors of civil society have different power resources at their disposal, and very often, notions of democratic consensus based upon market equilibria tend to marginalize this important factor. Indeed, as mentioned by White (1996), "analysts in the US tradition of pluralist political analysis tend to see civil society as a field of interest groups, often viewing the political process as a market and political outcome representing equilibria resulting from the interplay of social actors in civil society".
Those with greater access to socio-economic resources find it easier to organize effectively and vice versa. As a result, there are patterns of conflict between the constituent parts of civil society in terms of interests, norms, and power. This is where there is a role for the state: Harriss & de Rienzo (1997) suggest that the role played by civil society organizations will depend on the wider political setting, and on ways in which inequalities of power and resources are dealt with in the economic and political arena. Therefore, they conclude that political arguments, which pose civil society against the state, are "almost certainly misconceived". The state does not have to be in conflict with civil society, they can complement each other. In developing countries, the state has been and is instrumental in allocating property rights over resources and providing a stable political context within which development can take place.

. . . . .

Linkage between the two variables of democracy and governance at the global level

In conclusion, there are five key issues at the crossroads of democracy and governance:
·  First, at the national level, civil society must be strong, but this does not deny the role of the state. State and civil society should function as partners in a national “joint governance” based on formal democracy, power distribution between those who govern and those who are governed, negotiation processes between groups of stakeholders, and decentralization accompanied by flows of information to the centre.
·  Second, when considering the global level, the democratic outcome will depend on the nature of the interplay between the state, NGOs and international institutions.
·  Third, it is important to assess the scope for the globalization of democracy. The adaptation of democracy to different cultures and ethnic patterns is not straightforward.
·  Fourth, an implication of globalization for democracy is a change in the locus of decisionmaking: increased international interference through conditionality turns democracy into an obligation, and does away with a spontaneous democracy from below. Democracy from above is a contradiction in terms.
·  Fifth, because interdependence through globalization creates winners and losers, there is a need for a reform of global governance institutions and mechanisms, which should be based on responsibility, subsidiarity and plurality, and on the achievement of coherence across the local/national/global levels.


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The Global Scenario Group

Great Transition: The Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead

Strategies
The Great Transitions approach to a sustainable civilization builds on the wealth-generating features of Market Forces and the technological change of Policy Reform. But it transcends them by recognizing that market-led adaptations and government-led policy adjustments are not enough. Great Transitions adds a third ingredient—a values-led shift toward an alternative global vision. Powerful additional opportunities for mending the global environment and forging more harmonious social conditions would then open. The new development paradigm would include lifestyle changes and greater social solidarity."

Dimensions of Transition
A Great Transition envisions a profound change in the character of civilization in response to planetary challenges. Transitions have happened before at critical moments in history, such as the rise of cities thousands of years ago and the modern era of the last millennium. All components of culture change in the context of a holistic shift in the structure of society and its relation to nature. The transition of the whole social system entrains a set of sub-transitions that transform values and knowledge, demography and social relations, economic and governance institutions, and technology and the environment (Speth, 1992). These dimensions reinforce and amplify one another in an accelerating process of transformation.

Values and Knowledge
Prevailing values set the criteria for what is considered good, true and beautiful. They delineate what people want and how they want to live. Values are culturally conditioned, reflecting the social consensus on what is considered normal or desirable. Depending on its dominant values, a society lies along a continuum between antagonism and tolerance, individualism and solidarity, and materialism and a concern for deeper meaning. Individualism and consumerism drive the unsustainable trends of Conventional Worlds. But they are neither inherent nor inevitable. The plausibility of a Great Transition rests with the possibility that an alternative suite of values emerges to underpin global development.
    The distinction between “needs” and “wants” has profound implications for the transition. Physiological, psychological and social needs are universal, but culture shapes how they are perceived and how they are expressed as wants (Maslow, 1954). Advertising and media can stimulate new wants and the experience of them as felt needs. Values mediate how needs are transformed into wants and how they are satisfied. The need for sustenance can be satisfied by steak or vegetables. The need for self-esteem can be satisfied by a luxury car or a circle of friends. A value transition to post-consumerism, social solidarity and ecology would alter wants, ways of life and behaviors.

. . . . .

Economy and Governance
A Great Transition implies a revision in human institutions—the relationships and patterns that organize the behavior of a society.Institutional change would both drive and respond to parallel evolution in values, knowledge and ways of life. Critical to this process would be the changing character of the economy and governance.

. . . . .

While substantial investment in environmental and social goals would be required, the world economy has the resources for such an undertaking. Moreover, the transition would mobilize “new dividends.” A green dividend would flow from the cost-savings of eco-efficient corporations and the maintenance of society’s environmental capital. A peace dividend would stem from gradual reduction of the world’s $700 billion annual military expenditure to a sufficient level for world peace-keeping, perhaps $30 billion (Renner, 1994). A human capital dividend would come from harvesting the creativity and contributions of the billions who would otherwise be consigned to poverty. A technological dividend would derive from new opportunities for innovation and wider access to the information revolution. A solidarity dividend arises from reduced security and police costs.
    The economic transition is a matter of will, not resources. If values and priorities were to change, economic resources are at hand.



UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs  (new window, website)
Division for Social Policy and Development  (new window, website)

Mission Statement
"The main objective of the Division for Social Policy and Development is to strengthen international cooperation for social development, in the context of the comprehensive and detailed framework of commitments and policies for action by Governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations provided by the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development, with particular attention to the three core issues of poverty eradication, employment generation and social integration, in contributing to the creation of an international community that enables the building of secure, just, free and harmonious societies offering opportunities and higher standards of living for all."