Transformation To Sustainability:
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"The mission of
UNPAN - United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and
Finance - is to promote the sharing of knowledge, experiences and best
practices throughout the world in sound public policies, effective
public administration and efficient civil services, through
capacity-building and cooperation among the United Nations Member
States, with emphasis on south-south cooperation and UNPAN's commitment
to integrity and excellence."
earthmodal
note: ICT is Information and Communications Technology
Understanding Knowledge Societies: In twenty
questions and answers with the Index of Knowledge Societies (new
window, 1.00MB, pdf)
Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Division for Public
Administration and Development Management; United Nations, New York,
2005
1. In the process of knowledge development, there are two main assets
that can develop ad indefinitum: people (all people
everywhere, even
“the others” who, like poor people, hitherto have been treated as
dangerous deviants) as creative beings and carriers of tacit knowledge2 ; and, information (explicit
knowledge3) that triggers
people’s creative reflection, leading to the
appearance of “new meaning.”
1 The Report adopts the concept
of “shared spaces for knowledge
creation” that mirrors the theory of ba. Ba has the
following
characteristics: (1) Self-organization, with its own intention,
direction and mission. Participants in a ba must get
involved and
cannot be mere onlookers. A good ba needs
chaos, care and love, as well
as intention and direction. (2) An open boundary that allows both
cocooning, i.e. developing one’s own context, and openness to other
contexts. (3) Transcending the habitual patterns of time, space and
self. Ba lets
participants share time and space and transcend their own
limited perspectives or boundaries. (4) Multi-discipline and
multi-viewpoint dialogues. A good ba enables
essential dialogues that
allow participants to see themselves through one another. The quality
of the conversations we create is one of the most important measures of
the quality of ba.
(5) Equal access to the centre and maximum capacity
with minimum conflict. Every participant in a good ba is at the
same
distance from the centre. However, the centre is not a fixed point. In ba
anyone has the potential to be a centre and the centre can change as
the context evolves. Ba as a
sphere is constantly moving.
|
2 Tacit knowledge
is a fluid mix of
framed experience, values, contextual information and expert insights
that provides an individual with a framework for evaluating and
incorporating new experiences and information. Tacit knowledge is
information combined with experience, context, interpretation and
judgement. It is acquired through one’s own experience or reflections
on the experiences of others. It is intangible, without boundaries and
dynamic. It is highly personal and hard to formalize, making it
difficult to communicate or share with others. Subjective insights,
intuitions and hunches all fall into the category of tacit knowledge. |
| 3 Explicit knowledge
(information)
refers to “justified (true) belief” that is codified in formal,
systemic language. It can be combined, stored, retrieved and
transmitted with relative ease and through various means, including
modern ICT. |
4 “New meaning” is
the additional
value generated by creative processing of the available information by
people and measured by greater and/or new applicability/usefulness of
the processed information, as compared with the originally available
information. |
2. The skill to mass-produce knowledge is being brought to fruition in
a world that is organized predominantly into market democracies. The
social institutions of the currently existing democracies and currently
existing markets must allow (or be transformed to allow) limitless
development and use in the process of knowledge development of people
and information. This poses a challenge as the currently existing
democracies feature minorities with narrow encompassing interests5 that are allowed, by lack of
genuine participation, to control public power and to channel in a
disproportionate way, public resources and developmental opportunities
in their own direction. This translates into limited developmental
opportunities for many (or most) that happen to be on the other side of
the power divide. And, the currently existing markets are addicted to
an easy opportunity to split the total cost of the production of many
goods and services into two parts. One part (the smaller, the better)
is used to calculate the price at which the goods and services are
offered on the market. The other one (as large as the producer can get
away with) is usually referred to as “negative externalities.”6 The net negative
externalities constitute the loss to society as a whole. They translate
into limited development opportunities for people and gradually
increasing stress on the biosphere. In the
post-modern world, in which mass-produced knowledge “to do” offers
investment opportunities in products with high risk content, they add a
concern about “human safety” and “safety of life” in general to the
traditional development agenda that, till now, has been predominantly
focused on achieving “high quality” of life.
| 5 Mancur Olson,
in his book, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist
Dictatorships (Basic Books, 2000), puts forward a thesis that growth
and development in a society depend on the broadness of the encompassing interest represented
by those who control public power and are able to direct public
resources and developmental opportunities. An autocrat or a tiny
controlling minority in a democracy can afford not to be concerned with
the damage that their actions bring to the society as a whole. Thus
they not only usurp the right to a disproportional share of public
resources and developmental opportunities, but as a rule do not bother
to organize the society in ways that would help the less powerful
groups. As a result, human development suffers, some markets do not
exist, and full potential for growth and development is not realized.
He writes, “Astonishingly, sometimes [democratic] majorities and
especially super-majorities have a sufficiently encompassing interest
in society that they will out of pure self-interest, forgo
redistribution to themselves and treat the minority as well as they
treat themselves. Whenever there is a superencompassing interest, the
second invisible hand – the one that guides encompassing interest in
the use of coercive power – works in complete accord with the interest
of all.” |
6 In classical
economy, negative externalities
are the adverse economic effects that a transaction has on third
parties. Under competitive pressure, by definition, the contracting
parties cannot take into consideration whatever happens with society or
the biosphere (good or bad), even if it is directly related to the
contract. They aim at the market-clearing price: the lower the cost
reflected in the price, the greater the opportunity for profit. One can
change this equation by technological progress or shedding part of the
cost “for free.” Economically rational people would always make a
determined effort to shift part of the cost to voiceless participants
in the economic game – disenfranchised labour and the mute biosphere.
This is an addictive opportunity and power helps feed the addiction. If
the biosphere has been regaining a voice, for instance by demonstrating
the negative effects of global warming, for every advocate of the
biosphere, money can buy at least one advocate of unrestricted business
activity. If labour unionizes, the global market allows taking work to
unregulated labour markets. Mass production of the knowledge “to do”
cannot change such mindsets and such behaviour. To the contrary, it
offers more opportunities for feeding this addiction by opening new
markets that follow new demand. As a result, the pace of building the
pressure of “net negative externalities” on people in primary and
secondary labour markets, and on the biosphere, may only increase. But
nowadays this goes beyond wages below the poverty line, perpetuating
poverty, pollution, depleting ozone or causing global warming.
Recently, technological innovations have started to provide investors
with opportunities to profitably introduce to society, products with
very questionable and potentially harmful effects on life – human life
and life in general. The currently existing market would not have any
incentive to refuse them as long as demand for them exists or could be
artificially created. Thus, in the framework of the currently existing
market, mass-produced knowledge “to do” can hasten the pace, broaden
the scope and sharpen the harm to human development and to the
biosphere that is caused by negative externalities. On the other hand,
we know that since the mid-19th century technological progress has been
proving the anti-capitalist thinkers wrong by raising productivity and
thus providing a cushion that allows the system to continue. Till now
though, it has been about real incomes and managing the supply of
opportunities for human development. This time around, it would be
about all that, plus the safety of life. A “silver bullet” of
technology is not likely to solve our social and environmental
problems. This would require inter alia different mindsets. This would
require also markets that go to “rehab” and start to clear at
“addiction–clean” levels.
|
8 The idea of the “liveable state” reflects the belief
that the welfare state (national autonomy in social policy) may evolve
into a liveable state (national autonomy in maintaining a liveable
neighbourhood). In such a state, social institutions would guarantee as
a minimum, rule of law; peace; human rights and freedoms;
non-discrimination of any kind; a culture of democracy and open
political process; credible and competent public administration; a
solid social safety net; accessible and affordable education (lifelong
learning), health care, ICT infrastructure; a legal and financial
environment conducive to private business activities; and a clean
natural environment.
|
. . . . .
4. And finally, deployment of modern ICT in the context of knowledge
development allows the addition of the prefix “mass-” to the
production, diffusion and utilization of knowledge. However, as
illustrated below, in the future, ICT as a means for accelerating
production of knowledge is a resource whose impact on this process will
diminish and stabilize as a constant. People are the only factor for
accelerating the development of knowledge that is not finite and will
not become obsolete.

"The result of this investigation is less than complete due to lack of
adequate, comparable data. It is summarized in the Report’s
“illustrative” and “experimental” IKS (Index of Knowledge Societies).
IKS is a composite index of the three
measures: (1) assets; (2) development of assets, i.e. “advancement”;
and, (3) “foresightedness” in following a developmental direction, i.e.
commitment to high levels of quality and safety of life. It suggests
the following:
• In the random sample of 45 countries for which enough data could be
gathered, Sweden leads. The top 10 countries are ranked as follows:

"At the same time, being small does not give an automatic advantage,
nor is such an advantage assured by wealth. In the key measure of
“foresightedness” in development, both countries with high and low GDP
per capita are scattered all over the “foresightedness map.” What is
more, non-parametric regression7 of the Foresightedness Index results
against the GDP per capita suggests that the relationship between GDP
and “foresightedness” is non-linear, and when wealth is pushed beyond
certain value levels, its harmonic relationship with “smart” growth and
development tends to vanish; the additional wealth created beyond that
point tends to be associated with negative outcomes for human
development or the natural environment, or both. Explaining this
phenomenon in detail would most likely require a separate study.
However, one can formulate a thesis that if increases in wealth do not
go hand-in-hand with increases in equality of wealth distribution, high
levels of concentration of wealth may dramatically encourage the
narrowing of the encompassing interest that controls the distribution
of resources and developmental opportunities in a society."

Smart Knowledge Society
3. "To be a Smart Knowledge Society (as distinct from a Nominal or
Warped Knowledge Society), it is not enough to be rich in main assets
and to take care of their development. A new sense of direction in
development and a
commitment to this new direction must assure high levels of quality and
safety of life. Mass production of the knowledge “to do,” piling up
technological innovations, and converting them into products and
services in the framework of the Knowledge Economy managed by the
currently existing market does not by itself assure high levels of
quality and safety of life for all people everywhere. The new direction
in development can be formulated on the basis of using the techniques
and means to mass-produce knowledge to turn out and apply the knowledge
“to be,” to co-exist” and “to maintain developmental equilibrium.”

Main
thought:
|
To be a Smart Knowledge Society,
it is not enough to be rich in main assets and to take care of their
development. A new sense of direction in development and acommitment to
this new direction must assure high levels of …
|
|
|
... quality of life and …
|
… safety of life. |
| Origins
of the main thought: |
Mass
production of the knowledge “to do”; piling up technological
innovations; and converting them into products and services in the
framework of the Knowledge Economy managed by the currently existing
market does not by itself assure high levels of quality and safety of
life for all people every where.
* |
|
The new
direction in development can be formulated on the basis of using the
technique and means to mass-produce knowledge to turn out and apply the
knowledge “to be,” to co-exist” and “to maintain developmental
equilibrium.” |
| What
to watch? |
•
“ Liveable states”
• Culture industry
• Locus of decisions about well-being of mankind
• Agenda for R&D
• Practical uses of the knowledge “to do”
• Dialogue on the knowledge “to be”
• Principles that govern the moral code for making choices and taking
decisions
• The fate of the value of human solidarity
• Dialogue on the global unifying central cultural thought for humanity
• Development of people as citizens
• Evolution of the social institution of democracy
• Evolution of the social institution of the market |
|
|
|
|
Proxy
measurements
suggested by the Report: |
• GINI In d e x
• Child mortality |
• CO2 emissions
• Protected areas |
|
definition: GINI INDEX OF INCOME INEQUALITY
|
|
earthmodal
note: the GINI coefficient is explained in detail in document "Global
Scenario Group Futures: Technical Notes" which is downloaded in
Scenarios (above ) -- section GSG. The component items of "What
to watch?" in the table above are discussed in part in Worldviews'
Cultural and Spiritual Values of Biodiversity, particularly Chapter 11
- Ethical, Moral and Religious Concerns. The notions listed are really
quite profound and as such require some contemplation. Even a little
understanding,
however,
expands and redirects attention to those values which are of great
importance to success in sustainability, and in earthmodal's
opinion focus in this area is really worthwhile.
Source
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) (new
window, website)
UNESCO WORLD REPORT
Towards Knowledge Societies (new
window, 4.81 MB, pdf)
Published in 2005 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization
Book Design and layout by Roberto C. Rossi Cover design by Maro Haas
Quick
glace at the Table of Contents (new window,
html, this site)
Does the aim of building knowledge societies make any sense when
history and anthropology teach us that since ancient times, all
societies have probably been, each in its own way, knowledge societies?
Today, as in the past, the control of knowledge can
go hand in hand
with serious inequality, exclusion and social conflict. Knowledge was
long the exclusive domain of tight circles of wise men and the
initiated few. Secrecy was the organizing principle behind these
exclusive knowledge societies. In the Age of Enlightenment, the demand
for democracy, the concept of openness and the gradual emergence of a
public forum for knowledge, fostered the spread of the ideas of
universality, liberty and equality. The diffusion of knowledge through
books and the printing press, as well as the extension of an education
for all through schools and universities, accompanied this historical
development. But the ideal of a public knowledge forum, which is the
basis of UNESCO and of its Constitution, cannot be taken for granted.
The current spread of new technologies and the
emergence of the
internet as a public network seem to be carving out fresh opportunities
to widen this public knowledge forum. Might we now have the means to
achieve equal and universal access to knowledge, and genuine sharing?
This should be the cornerstone of true knowledge societies, which are a
source of human and sustainable development.
Source
Canada's
International Development Research Centre
(IDRC,
the Centre)
generates and applies new knowledge to address problems in developing
countries.
HUMAN SECURITY AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY
The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment
(2nd edition); Jorge Nef; IDRC 1999;
ISBN 0-88936-879-1; 140 pp.
The concept of a world system
A useful heuristic device to help one understand the present crises
in their context is the notion of a world system (Cox 1978; Galtung
1980; Wallerstein 1980). This construct encompasses historical,
structural, and functional features that make it possible to analyze
and reassess changing global conjunctures, irrespective of the type of
polarity found in the system. A world system is the type of dominant
and integrated pattern of global production, distribution, and power
that had its foundations in the 17th century and has expanded and
consolidated in the last two centuries (Wallerstein 1980; Bergesen
1983). It involves an unequal and asymmetrical exchange between a
developed core and underdeveloped semiperipheries and peripheries, in
which systemic and subsystemic development and underdevelopment are
functionally and historically, but not deterministically, interrelated.
Core, centres, and peripheries
Despite the use of geographical and spatial concepts, relations in
the present system are not so much those between territorially defined
centres and peripheries (nations, regions, or settlements) as among
concrete social actors: groups, classes, and individuals living in the
North or the South. Core and centre are distinct concepts. The core
comprises elite socioeconomic groups already transnationally
integrated. The centre comprises the developed geographical regions,
which contain, as do peripheral regions, their own elite core and a
nonelite social periphery. Development and underdevelopment are
conditions experienced by people, not abstract aggregations that define
the totality of a territory. The idea of developed and underdeveloped
nations, First and Third worlds, North and South, obscures the fact
that in any society a significant degree of transnational integration
occurs among its dominant groups, as well as the effective
marginalization of the bulk of its people. As an historical model, the
notion of a world system avoids the more simplistic and often
mechanistic applications of international-stratification and dependency
theories and for that matter the neofunctional fallacy of global and
complex interdependency. It also looks at the underlying logic that
links cores, semiperipheries, and peripheries as parts of a single
structure and process, both at present and in the wider historical
perspective.
Regimes
A world system presupposes the existence of regimes, or mechanisms
of governance with structures of decision-making, rules, and influence
(Keohane and Nye 1975; Hopkins and Puchala 1978). Unlike institutions
or “international organizations,” which presuppose the existence of
differentiated, formally sanctioned norms and mechanisms of governance,
regimes constitute the actually existing arrangements for handling a
particular cluster of issues. Regimes are subsystems of the larger
global system. Some are highly institutionalized, have clear
boundaries, and enjoy a notable degree of concentricity. Others are
loose and without a recognizable authority structure. Regimes also vary
considerably in terms of how effectively they manage the issues in
their areas of concern. I examine regimes in more detail in subsequent
chapters.
Power and governance
One important empirical aspect of the analysis of regimes is
ascertaining who governs, as real power structures are often neither
formalized nor transparent. Power, understood as the ability of one
actor or cluster of actors to induce compliant behaviour in others
(Dahl 1970), is therefore the very essence of the global system and its
constituent regimes. So is powerlessness. But such ability and
inability are essentially dynamic and multidimensional. For one thing,
power entails a fluid and changing relationship between ends (what for)
and means (with what) and is much more than the sum of the resource
capabilities, or even possible resource commitments, of an actor or an
alliance. In the last analysis, effective power can only be assessed in
terms of outcomes vis-à-vis objectives pursued and resources
used. In this sense, authority in the Weberian sense of legitimated
power (Weber 1947) requiring minimal amounts of coercion (or
conversely, rewards) is an efficient and effective element in regime
governance. Governance essentially involves both the government’s and
the governed’s having the ability to manage conflict with limited use
of violence or coercion.
Power and metapower
A second important aspect in the analysis of regimes is drawing the
distinction between power and relational control, or metapower
(Baumgartner el al. 1977). The latter is the ability to affect the
outcome of decisions, nondecisions, actions, and inactions in a given
regime by altering the rules of the game. Metapower can be associated
with three fundamental concepts representing diverse intellectual
traditions in political analysis. One is the above-mentioned idea of
legitimation on grounds of tradition, charisma, or legal–rational
calculation, as developed by Weber; the second is Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony (Cox 1978); and the third is Crozier’s (1964) observation
regarding the relationship between power and uncertainty. Very few
actors at any given time possess legitimacy, can articulate hegemonic
discourses, or have established control over the sources of
uncertainty. More often than not, those who can affect the outcome of
an interaction, both within specific functional or regional regimes and
in the global system, are elite sectors within the core.
|
Table 1. The global system.
|
| |
Ecology
(life)
|
Economy
(wealth)
|
Society
(support of well-being, affection, respect, rectitude)
|
Polity
(power)
|
Culture
(knowledge, skill)
|
|
|
Context
|
Natural setting (biophysical surroundings of social action)
|
Styles of development (economic models)
|
Social expectations and traditions
|
Internal and external conflicts (capabilities and expectations
of the elite and the masses; sovereignty and dependence)
|
Images of the physical and social world and collective
experiences
|
|
Culture
|
Ecoculture (place of environment in cosmovision)
|
Economic doctrines (ways of understanding the economy)
|
Social doctrines (values, norms, attitudes; identity and modal
personality)
|
Ideologies (function of the state and its relation to the
citizen)
|
Philosophy (axiologies, teleologies, deontologies); moral and
ethical codes
|
|
Structures
|
Resource endowment and spatial distribution (relation between
environment and resources)
|
Economic units (consumers and producers; labour and capital)
|
Status and roles (social structures, groups, classes,
fractions)
|
Brokers and institutions (interest groups, parties, cliques,
governments, bureaucracies)
|
Formal and informal educational structures (schools,
universities, learning institutions)
|
|
Processes
|
Depletion or regeneration of air, water, land, flora, and fauna
|
Production and distribution of goods and services
|
Interactions (cooperation, conflict, mobilization,
demobilization)
|
Conflict resolution (consensus, repression, rebellion,
stalemate)
|
Learning (building of consciousness, cognitions, basic values,
procedures, teleologies)
|
|
Effects
|
Sustainability or entropy
|
Prosperity or poverty
|
Equity or inequity
|
Governance or violence
|
Enlightenment or ignorance
|
|
The dynamics of the system involves the actions and interactions
(Holsti 1972) of actors pursuing goals and using resources in —
as well as having effects on — a given context and the system’s
internal configuration. Changing circumstances, in turn, generate
feedback. Dysfunctions produced at the dominant core end up not only
having negative impacts on subordinate actors but also generating a
delayed and secondary reaction from the centre itself. Conversely,
cumulative dysfunctions in the periphery are bound to flow upstream,
increasing the uncertainty and instability of the centre and the entire
system of global relations. In this sense, contrary to commonly held
belief, an increasingly integrated world is also one of mutually
assured vulnerability. More than a “zero-sum” game (Deutsch 1968), the
possibility of the opposite of the prisoner’s dilemma confronts
us — a negative-score game in which all the players stand to lose.
operations note:
place document in the.. /mea/new directory
Ecosystems & Human Well-Being: Volume 3: Policy
Responses
(new window, 992KB, pdf)
findings of the
Responses Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment / edited
by Kanchan Chopra . . . [et al.].
(The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment series ; v. 3)
Chapter 15 Integrated Responses

Figure 15.1. The Ecosystem
Approach. The ecosystem approach contains the above elements, although
it is not limited to them. The operational implementation of the
ecosystem approach foresees the implementation of all principles
together. Its application should be adapted to specific situations and
frame conditions. (CBD Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and
Technological Advice 2003; Ecosystem Approach Annex 1)
Main Messages
Integrated
responses intentionally and actively address ecosystem services and
human well-being simultaneously. They are gaining in importance in both
developing and industrial countries, albeit with mixed results.
Although many integrated responses make ambitious claims about their
likely benefits, in practice the results of implementation have been
varied in terms of ecological, social, and economic impacts.
Integrated responses are closely allied to the concept and
implementation of sustainable development.
The interrelationship between ecological, economic, and social systems
and the motivation to bring them together in policy and other
interventions links the two.
Trade-offs and synergies are central to the development of integrated
responses.
Integrated responses seek to explicitly manage trade-offs and to
identify positive and negative synergies between different objectives
and between ecosystem services and human well-being.
Integrated responses occur at international, national, and sub-national
levels.
Examples at the international level include some multilateral
environmental agreements, and international agreements such as the Rio
Conventions. Policy integration is a growing feature of many national
governments. This is evidenced through national strategies for
sustainable development and many other initiatives. Integrated
responses are perhaps more usually associated with sub-national and
local programs, including multisectoral approaches such as integrated
coastal zone management and integrated river basin management.
Many integrated responses occur simultaneously at multiple levels.
Integrated responses may be ‘‘nested’’ within different discrete
levels, for example, the embedding of Local Agenda 21 within national
strategies for sustainable development, developed under the overall
framework of Agenda 21. Integrated responses may also be of a multiple
scale, and not related to distinct government or administrative levels,
but to geographical units such as a watershed or a transboundary marine
ecosystem.
Scale issues are critical in integrated responses, and cross-scale
responses are necessary.
Integrated responses are often deemed successful at a small-scale, or
in a particular locality. However, their effectiveness is limited when
constraints are encountered at higher levels, such as in legal
frameworks and in government institutions. There appear to be limits to
scaling up, not only because of these higher-level constraints, but
also because of so-called ‘‘leakage’’ problems. These occur when
interventions at a local level address only direct, rather than
indirect, or underlying drivers of change. Examples might be where
integrated conservation and development projects cause increased
migration into buffer zones, or where a carbon forestry project shifts
deforestation to another location. In these cases, the problems of
ecosystem degradation are merely shifted from one location to another.
Cross-scale responses may be better able to deal with both the
higher-level constraints and leakage problems, and simultaneously
tackle the regional and national, as well as, local drivers of change.
Examples of successful cross-scale responses include some co-management
approaches to natural resource management in fisheries and forestry,
and multistakeholder policy processes.
Integration is also about getting a wider range of actors involved in
policy processes and about different forms of intervention and action.
Successfully integrated responses usually include the active
participation of key stakeholders. Increasingly, they are
associated with the application of multistakeholder processes and with
decentralization, and they may include actors and institutions from the
government, civil society, and the private sector.
Implementing
integrated responses is resource intensive, but the potential benefits
can exceed the costs.
Integrated responses are inherently complex, often entailing a
combination of actions in a range of domains and at different scales.
This can be very costly and requires specialized skills and knowledge.
For example, the costs of bringing stakeholders to the negotiation
table and of employing participatory methodologies in decision-making
are often high. However, if decisions command the broad support of
stakeholders, they are more likely to be successfully implemented.
Politics plays an important role in integrated responses at all scales.
As integrated responses require bringing together a variety of
institutions and individuals with vested interests, and negotiating
trade-offs between sectors and actors, collaboration and compromise
play a vital role. Successful integrated responses often incorporate
conflict resolution mechanisms and deliberative inclusionary processes
into their decision-making and management procedures.
Integrated responses do not necessarily bring about more equitable
distribution of benefits to stakeholders.
It cannot be assumed that integrated responses are more or less likely
to deliver their stated objectives than nonintegrated responses. In
most cases integrated responses meet some of their objectives, but not
all. Many integrated responses assume that there are synergies between
objectives and fail to adequately consider and evaluate tradeoffs. This
results in unexpected or unanticipated problems and costs, both to
ecosystems and society. Generally, the distribution of benefits is not
equitable, and this stems from an inadequate consideration of the
social, economic, and political dynamics of society. In a number of
cases, the failure to appreciate the heterogeneity of communities,
property rights, and access to resources, power, and knowledge of
different sectors within society are of critical importance and need to
be fully understood.
Integrated responses require multiple instruments for their
implementation.
Integrated responses have a complex nature, because of their multiple
objectives and often multiscale characteristics. Therefore, a single
instrument is rarely adequate to implement them. Market-based and
economic instruments are used with increasing frequency in integrated
responses, for example, in river basin management and sustainable
forest management, but they usually need to be accompanied by other
instruments. These are likely to include redistributive measures and
property rights adjustments (for example, when setting up new markets)
and institutional development and capacity building. Integrated
responses, therefore, require a careful coordination of multiple
instruments.
Integrated responses are long-term undertakings not short-term projects.
A review of the literature indicates that integrated responses cannot
be treated as finite, time-bound projects, nor can they easily be added
on to existing policies and interventions. They often require a longer
timescale before impacts can be realized or a broad constituency of
support can be established. Integrated responses, therefore, should be
seen as intrinsic components of long-term changes in environmental
governance.
Integrated responses require fundamental shifts in governance
institutions in terms of skills, knowledge capacity, and organization.
The experience of many integrated responses shows that the conventional
organization of governance institutions militates against successful
design and implementation of integrated responses, because the
institutions are separated along sectoral lines. This is especially
true for government organizations, in both industrial and developing
countries, and creates barriers in the transmission of knowledge and
information and collaboration across the boundaries of organizations.
Within organizations, power and prestige is maintained and conferred by
defending knowledge rather than sharing it, resulting in ‘‘turf
defending’’ behavior, which needs to change in order to better support
integrated responses.
Knowledge gaps are persistent and inhibit integrated responses.
Knowledge gaps are prevalent in several different dimensions and
constitute significant constraints to the more widespread successful
implementation of integrated responses. Science itself is defined in
disciplinary terms, and this undermines more holistic inclusionary
approaches to understanding complex social and ecological systems.
Furthermore, information needs to be shared and coordinated across
disciplines and organizations.
Assessing integrated responses, assessing trade-offs and providing
decision support requires multidisciplinary methods and techniques to
capture the multiple impacts and assess multiple goals. Examples
of good practice can be found in a number of multidisciplinary
techniques such as Multicriteria Analysis. When used collaboratively
within a multistakeholder process, these can help in the analysis of
trade-offs, reconciliation of conflicts, and development of adaptive
management strategies.
operations
note: Ecosystems ... is downloaded in Assessment (this site)
Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A
Framework for Assessment
8 Strategic Interventions, Response
Options, and Decision-making
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Decision-making processes and institutions operate across spatial
scales and organizational levels—from the village to the planet.
Decision processes are value-based and combine political and technical
elements to varying degrees. Desirable properties of decision-making
processes include equity, attention to vulnerability, transparency,
accountability, and participation.
- Strategies and interventions that
will help meet societies’ goals for the conservation and sustainable
use of ecosystems include incorporating the value of ecosystems in
decisions, channeling diffuse ecosystem benefits to decisionmakers with
focused local interests, creating markets and property rights,
educating and dispersing knowledge, and investing to improve ecosystems
and the services they provide.
- The choice among options will be greatly influenced by the
temporal and
physical scale of the problem or opportunity, the uncertainties, the
cultural context, and questions of equity.
- Mechanisms for accomplishing these interventions include
conventions,
laws, regulations, and enforcement; contracts, partnerships, and
collaboration; and private and public action.
- Institutions at different levels have different response options
available to them, and special care is required to ensure policy
coherence. Decision-making processes combine problem identification and
analysis, policy option identification, policy choice, policy
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation in an iterative fashion.
- A range of tools is available to choose among response
options—from
cultural prescriptive rules to cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness
analysis. In the selection of an analytical tool and in the evaluation
of response options, the social, economic, environmental, and
historical context should be taken into account.
- Policies at each level and scale need to be adaptive and flexible
in
order to learn from past experience, to hedge against risk, and to
consider uncertainty. However, trade-offs between the responsiveness
and the stability of the policy environment need to be considered.
- Intermediate indicators may be required to link policies and
actions
and their impacts on ecosystems and human well-being. Quantitative
indicators make the trade-offs in policy-making explicit, but
qualitative information is valuable where measurement is not possible.
Traditional and practitioner knowledge are important sources in
addition to science.
- “Boundary organizations” that synthesize and translate scientific
research and explore the policy implications can bridge the gap between
science and decision-making. Journalists have a similar bridging
responsibility to ensure
that science and policy information is transmitted to the public in
ways that are both objective and engaging
Usable Knowledge
A simplified picture of the role of knowledge in decision-making
is shown in Figure 8.1, which portrays three interacting processes:
monitoring, the decision-making cycle, and the flow of information to
and from stakeholders. Policy-making starts by identifying a problem,
then it defines policy options and their choice, formulation, and
implementation, and ideally it finishes with monitoring and evaluation
of the results of executed actions. The process is interactive and
iterative and takes place within a specific institutional structure. At
all stages, decisions are based on the values, preferences, intuitions,
prejudices, and social situations of the organizations
and individuals who make them. The process engages all “stakeholders,”
including effective delivery of essential information to
decisionmakers, communication among stakeholders, and multidirectional
exchanges among information providers and information users.
Measurement assembles information from regular monitoring (the outer
cycle in Figure 8.1) and other sources. The identification, analysis,
and advocacy of issues all require comprehensive and detailed knowledge
of human (socioeconomic) and environmental conditions and major trends,
including the nature, distribution, and impact of direct and indirect
drivers. Hence they need to draw on accounts, spatial assessments, a
comprehensive indicator-based assessment, and sometimes also a science
assessment. (See Box 8.1.)

The same tools are required for the analysis of options and the choice
of actions or policies. They provide the detailed knowledge necessary
to examine which issues to address and in what ways, taking account of
feasibility, cost-effectiveness, and the likely impacts of different
options on socioeconomic and environmental conditions as well as on
particular stakeholders. Policies are implemented through institutions.
An institutional analysis is necessary to identify the constraints on
implementation and what needs to be done to overcome them. Because
implementation depends heavily on the active support and participation
of stakeholders, they need to be informed and feedback should be
obtained from them at every stage in the decision-making cycle.
Monitoring and indicator-based assessments track implementation,
recording:
- whether actions or policies were implemented,
- whether they achieved their intended results, and
- whether new factors have arisen, in which case the entire cycle
is repeated.
Failure to implement requires examining whether the policy was correct,
the necessary constituency developed, the instruments put in place,
and—if all that happened—the instruments were appropriate. If the
relevant indicators used by the indicator-based assessment are unlikely
to change in time, one or more intermediate or proximate indicators
will be needed to establish a causal link between the actions or
policies and the intended results in terms of their impacts on
ecosystems and human wellbeing. This may be complex, as changes in the
state of ecosystems and provisioning of services can be caused by
several factors operating simultaneously, such as parallel policies, or
by external factors such as changes in economic activities. Also,
ecosystems are dynamic by nature, and human-
induced changes cannot always be distinguished from natural ones. Time
lags between responses and ecosystem improvement or change can be
considerable, and therefore it is important to evaluate impacts on
direct and indirect drivers as well.
. . . . .
operations
note: A Framework is downloaded in Assessment (this site)
Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: A Framework for Assessment - Chapter 4
4 Drivers of Change in Ecosystems and Their Services
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Understanding the factors that cause changes in ecosystems and
ecosystem services is essential to the design of interventions that
enhance positive and minimize negative impacts.
- A driver is any natural or human-induced factor that directly or
indirectly causes a change in an ecosystem. A direct driver
unequivocally influences ecosystem processes and can therefore be
identified and measured to differing degrees of accuracy. An indirect
driver operates more diffusely, often by altering one or more direct
drivers, and its influence is established by understanding its effect
on direct drivers.
- Decision-makers influence some drivers and are influenced by
other drivers. The first are the endogenous drivers and the latter are
the exogenous ones. Conceptually, decisions are made at three
organizational levels: by individuals and small groups at the local
level who directly alter some part of the ecosystem; by public and
private decision-makers at municipal, provincial, and national levels;
and by public and private decision-makers at the international level.
In reality, however, the distinction between these levels is often
diffuse and difficult to define.
- The degree to which a driver is outside the influence of a
decision-making process depends to some extent on the temporal scale.
Some factors may be exogenous in the short run but subject to change by
a decision-maker over longer periods.
- Local decision-makers can directly influence the choice of
technology, changes in land use, and external inputs but have little
control over prices and markets, property rights, technology
development, or the local climate. National or regional decision-makers
have more control over many indirect drivers, such as macroeconomic
policy, technology development, property rights, trade barriers,
prices, and markets.
- The indirect drivers of change are primarily demographic,
economic, sociopolitical, scientific and technological, and cultural
and religious. The interaction of several of these drivers in turn
affects the overall level of resource consumption and disparities in
consumption within and between countries. Clearly these drivers are
changing: population and the global economy are growing, there are
major advances in information technology and biotechnology, and the
world is becoming more interconnected. Changes in these drivers are
projected to increase the demand for food, fiber, clean water, and
energy, which will in turn affect the direct drivers. The direct
drivers are primarily physical, chemical, and biological, such as land
cover change, climate change, air and water pollution, irrigation, use
of fertilizers, harvesting, and the introduction of alien invasive
species.
- Any decision can have consequences external to the decision
framework. These are called externalities because they are not part of
the decision-making calculus. Externalities can have positive or
negative effects. The effect of an externality is seldom confined to
the environs of the decision-maker. External effects extend to other
parts of the ecosystem and even to other ecosystems. It is possible for
individually unimportant external effects to have dramatic regional and
global consequences when many local decision-makers simultaneously take
decisions with similar unintended consequences.
- Multiple, interacting drivers cause changes in ecosystem
services. There are functional interdependencies between and among the
indirect and direct drivers of change, and, in turn, changes in
ecological services lead to feedbacks on the drivers of changes in
ecological services. Synergetic driver combinations are very common.
The many processes of globalization are leading to new forms of
interactions among drivers of changes in ecosystem services.
. . . . .
There is a substantial literature examining the role of
culture in shaping human environmental behavior. It focuses primarily
on variations within a nation rather than across nations, in part
because it is extremely difficult to establish causal effects of a
variable as broad in conceptualization as culture. Two central concerns
of the literature are the degree to which the environmentally salient
parts of a culture are amenable to change and the degree to which
culture actually influences behavior with regard to the environment.
There is considerable debate about the first concern. Again, broad
generalizations are not warranted, but it is clear that some aspects of
culture can change with great rapidity while other elements are
inherently conservative.
A substantial body of literature provides lessons on how policies and
programs can most effectively produce cultural change around
environmental behavior (Dietz and Stern 2002). Obviously, the
relationship between culture and behavior is context-specific. Indeed,
one important lesson of research on this topic is that overarching
generalizations are seldom correct, that the ability of culture to
shape behavior depends on the constraints faced by individuals, and
that the effects of changing constraints on behavior depend on the
culture of the individuals encountering the changes (Gardner and Stern
1995; Guagnano et al. 1995).

Management
of Social
Transformations (MOST) Programme (new window,
website)
About MOST
"MOST
is the only UNESCO programme that fosters and
promotes
social science research. This places MOST in a pivotal position in the
overall promotion of UNESCO's goals.
Background
"The MOST Programme, which is part of the Social and Human
Sciences
Sector (SHS) of UNESCO, was launched in March 1994. It was designed as
a research programme to produce reliable and relevant knowledge for
policy makers. The original mandate established a strong commitment to
the promotion of research that was comparative, international,
interdisciplinary and policy relevant. The programme was also designed
to organize and promote international research networks, to give
attention to capacity building and to establish a clearing house of
knowledge in the social science field."
Democratising Global Governance: The Challenges of the
World Social Forum (new
window, 124KB, pdf)
Francesca Beausang, Management of Social
Transformations
(MOST), Discussion Paper 59, UNESCO, 2002: (SHS -2002/WS/4)
1 Democracy at the national level: prerequisites to a global democracy
1.1 Civil society as necessary to make
democracy work
The above definitions can be contextualised by looking at them in
national and global contexts.4
Before discussing the implications of globalization for democracy, it
is important to understand what promotes democracy at the national
level. In turn, as Putnam would say, “making democracy work” at the
national level is partly determined by what happens at the grassroots
(see box below).
|
Two successful grassroots
initiatives related by Bunker Roy and Anil Gupta |
|
Bunker Roy’s Barefoot College in Tilonia (India) is the “living example
of local people using their own skills to meet their own needs and
manage their own resources”. At the College, Barefoot health workers,
engineers, accountants and teachers have replaced the urban-based paper
qualified professionals. Indeed, experience taught the founders of the
College that staff who came from local villages often deferred to
urban-educated staff and did not have confidence to express opinions.
Also, by excluding urban professionals, they found the solution to the
problem of identification of the rural poor, as many of the staff are
themselves the rural poor of their villages.
Anil Gupta describes a similar grassroots initiative called the Honey
Bee network. Like Roy, Gupta celebrates local initiatives; in addition,
Gupta calls for the preservation of ethical capital, as opposed to
social capital: Gupta justifies this differentiation on the grounds
that “trust and good will also exist among members of the mafia”.
However, if one goes by Hirschman’s definition, social capital itself
is inherently one of “moral resources”, whose supply increases through
use, rather than the opposite, which becomes depleted if not used
(quoted in Putnam, 1993). The more two people display trust towards one
another, the greater their mutual confidence. It is this ethos that
sustains economic dynamism and government performance, according to
Putnam, so that the distinction between ethical and social capital
might not be as clear as Gupta suggests. |
1.2 Political consciousness and social
capital
The existence of a political consciousness and social capital is also a
pre-requisite of democracy, as emphasized by Sarah Ben Nefissa. She
looks at the last presidential and legislative elections in Egypt,
which took place in 2000, and analyses voting patterns. She finds that
the most important outcome of these elections, which were conducted for
the first time under the control of the Supreme Constitutional Court,
is that independent candidates seemed to gather most of the votes. She
wonders whether this implies the end of politics in Egypt, in that the
electorate does not select a party for its programmatic politics, but
rather elects a personality, that provides it with the most services.
Ben Nefissa mentions another aspect of Egyptian political life, which
is that the individual elector still does not exist. Ben Nefissa
considers the role of youth to be essential in its emergence. She makes
it clear that a requirement of democratisation is that the individual
elector become self-conscious and exercises his/her stakeholding power
over political processes.
4
For the sake of simplicity and structure, the discussion of local
democracy and governance is incorporated to the section on the national
level, but it must be clear that the local, national, and global levels
are equally important and interdependent determinants of democracy and
governance.
1.3 State/civil society
The Egyptian example also implies that the functioning of democracy
requires a strong civil society, but a civil society that is
politicised, and interacts with the state through concrete
participation in decisionmaking processes. It is also important to
analyse the political sub-content of civil society organizations. "It
is the articulation of goals, power of ideas and efficacy of
organizations that will determine [their] political purposes" (Putzel,
1997).
The existence of civil society groups “from below” is not sufficient
for democracy to work. In fact, civil society can be “undemocratic” if
it is isolated. Different sectors of civil society have different power
resources at their disposal, and very often, notions of democratic
consensus based upon market equilibria tend to marginalize this
important factor. Indeed, as mentioned by White (1996), "analysts in
the US tradition of pluralist political analysis tend to see civil
society as a field of interest groups, often viewing the political
process as a market and political outcome representing equilibria
resulting from the interplay of social actors in civil society".
Those with greater access to socio-economic resources find it easier to
organize effectively and vice versa. As a result, there are patterns of
conflict between the constituent parts of civil society in terms of
interests, norms, and power. This is where there is a role for the
state: Harriss & de Rienzo (1997) suggest that the role played by
civil society organizations will depend on the wider political setting,
and on ways in which inequalities of power and resources are dealt with
in the economic and political arena. Therefore, they conclude that
political arguments, which pose civil society against the state, are
"almost certainly misconceived". The state does not have to be in
conflict with civil society, they can complement each other. In
developing countries, the state has been and is instrumental in
allocating property rights over resources and providing a stable
political context
within which development can take place.
. . . . .
Linkage between the two variables of democracy and governance at
the global level
In conclusion, there are five key issues at the crossroads of
democracy and governance:
· First, at the national level, civil society must be
strong, but this
does not deny the role of the state. State and civil society should
function as partners in a national “joint governance” based on formal
democracy, power distribution between those who govern and those who
are governed, negotiation processes between groups of stakeholders, and
decentralization accompanied by flows of information to the centre.
· Second, when considering the global level, the
democratic outcome
will depend on the nature of the interplay between the state, NGOs and
international institutions.
· Third, it is important to assess the scope for the
globalization of
democracy. The adaptation of democracy to different cultures and ethnic
patterns is not straightforward.
· Fourth, an implication of globalization for democracy is
a change in
the locus of decisionmaking: increased international interference
through conditionality turns democracy into an obligation, and does
away with a spontaneous democracy from below. Democracy from above is a
contradiction in terms.
· Fifth, because interdependence through globalization
creates winners
and losers, there is a need for a reform of global governance
institutions and mechanisms, which should be based on responsibility,
subsidiarity and plurality, and on the achievement of coherence across
the local/national/global levels.
operations
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this site)
The Global Scenario Group
Great Transition: The
Promise and Lure of the Times Ahead
Strategies
The Great Transitions approach to a sustainable civilization builds on
the wealth-generating features of Market Forces and the technological
change of Policy Reform. But it transcends them by recognizing that
market-led adaptations and government-led policy adjustments are not
enough. Great Transitions adds a third ingredient—a values-led shift
toward an alternative global vision. Powerful additional opportunities
for mending the global environment and forging more harmonious social
conditions would then open. The new development paradigm would
include lifestyle changes and greater social solidarity."
Dimensions of Transition
A Great Transition envisions a profound change in the character of
civilization in response to planetary challenges. Transitions have
happened before at critical moments in history, such as the rise of
cities thousands of years ago and the modern era of the last
millennium. All components of culture change in the context of a
holistic shift in the structure of society and its relation to nature.
The transition of the whole social system entrains a set of
sub-transitions that transform values and knowledge, demography and
social relations, economic and governance institutions, and technology
and the environment (Speth, 1992). These dimensions reinforce and
amplify one another in an accelerating process of transformation.
Values and Knowledge
Prevailing values set the criteria for what is considered good, true
and beautiful. They delineate what people want and how they want to
live. Values are culturally conditioned, reflecting the social
consensus on what is considered normal or desirable. Depending on its
dominant values, a society lies along a continuum between antagonism
and tolerance, individualism and solidarity, and materialism and a
concern for deeper meaning. Individualism and consumerism drive the
unsustainable trends of Conventional Worlds. But they are neither
inherent nor inevitable. The plausibility of a Great Transition rests
with the possibility that an alternative suite of values emerges to
underpin global development.
The distinction between “needs” and “wants” has
profound implications
for the transition. Physiological, psychological and social needs are
universal, but culture shapes how they are perceived and how they are
expressed as wants (Maslow, 1954). Advertising and media can stimulate
new wants and the experience of them as felt needs. Values mediate how
needs are transformed into wants and how
they are satisfied. The need for sustenance can be satisfied by steak
or vegetables. The need for self-esteem can be satisfied by a luxury
car or a circle of friends. A value transition to post-consumerism,
social solidarity and ecology would alter wants, ways of life and
behaviors.
. . . . .
Economy and Governance
A Great Transition implies a revision in human institutions—the
relationships and patterns that organize the behavior of a
society.Institutional change would both drive and respond to parallel
evolution in values, knowledge and ways of life. Critical to this
process would be the changing character of the economy and governance.
. . . . .
While substantial investment in environmental and social goals would be
required, the world economy has the resources for such an undertaking.
Moreover, the transition would mobilize “new dividends.”
A green
dividend would flow from the cost-savings of eco-efficient
corporations and the maintenance of society’s environmental capital. A peace
dividend would stem from gradual reduction of the world’s $700
billion annual military expenditure to a sufficient level for world
peace-keeping, perhaps $30 billion (Renner, 1994). A human
capital dividend would come from harvesting the creativity and
contributions of the billions who would otherwise be consigned to
poverty. A technological
dividend would derive from new opportunities for innovation and
wider access to the information revolution. A solidarity
dividend arises from reduced security and police costs.
The economic transition is a matter of will, not
resources. If values and priorities were to change, economic resources
are at hand.
UN
Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (new window,
website)
Division
for Social Policy and Development (new window,
website)
Mission Statement
"The main objective
of the Division for Social Policy and Development is to strengthen
international cooperation for social development, in the context of the
comprehensive and detailed framework of commitments and policies for
action by Governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations provided by the Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development and Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social
Development, with particular attention to the three core issues of
poverty eradication, employment generation and social integration, in
contributing to the creation of an international community that enables
the building of secure, just, free and harmonious societies offering
opportunities and higher standards of living for all."