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Beyond the Limits-Executive Summary |
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Confronting Global Collapse, Envisioning a
Sustainable Future
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Overshoot
The following are characteristics of a society
that has
grown beyond its limits—a society that is drawing upon the
earth's
resources faster than they can be restored, and that is releasing
wastes and
pollutants faster than the earth can absorb them or render them
harmless.
A society like this is in a state of overshoot.
To
overshoot means to go too far, to grow so large so quickly that limits
are
exceeded. When an overshoot occurs, it induces stresses—in this case in
both
natural and social processes—that begin to work to slow and stop growth.
If humanity does not correct its condition of
overshoot,
problems like the ones listed above will worsen, until human productive
capacity, ingenuity, adaptability, and attention are overwhelmed. At
that point
overshoot will turn into collapse.
However, collapse is not the only possible
outcome. The
human society can ease down from beyond the limits. That need not mean
reducing
population or capital or living standards, though it certainly means
reducing
their growth. What must go down, and quickly, are throughputs—flows
of
material and energy from the supporting environ-ment, through the
economy, and
back to the environment.
Fortunately, in a perverse way, the current
global economy
is so wasteful, inefficient, and inequitable that it has tremendous
potential
for reducing throughputs while raising the quality of life for
everyone. While
that is happening, other measures—nontechnical measures, evolutionary
human
measures—can restructure the social system, so that overshoot never
happens
again.
Looking
into the
Future with World3
To understand how the human economy and the
environment
may unfold in the future, we use a computer model called World3. World3
is, like
all models, much, much simpler than the real world. It is, however,
more
dynamically sophisticated than many computer models. It is a nonlinear
feedback
model, one that tries to capture the forces behind population and
capital
growth, the layers of changing, interlinked environmental limits, and
the
delays in the physical and economic processes through which human
society
interacts with its environment.
World3
shows, in no uncertain terms, that if the world
system continues to evolve with no significant changes, the most likely
result
is not only overshoot, but collapse, and within another few decades.
One
possible future, by no means the only one, is shown in Scenario 1.
In this scenario the world society proceeds
along its
historical path as long as possible without major policy change.
Technology
advances in agriculture, industry, and social services according to
established
patterns. The simulated world tries to bring all people into an
industrial and
then post-industrial economy.
The global population in this scenario rises
from 1.6
billion in 1900 to over 5 billion in 1990 and over 6 billion in the
year 2000.
Total industrial output expands by a factor of 20 between 1900 and
1990, and it
does so while using only 20% of the earth's total stock of nonrenewable
resources. In 1990 80% of these resources remain. Pollution in that
year has
just begun to rise significantly. Life expectancy is increasing,
services and
goods per capita are increasing, food production is increasing. But
major
changes are just ahead.
Just after the simulated year 2000 pollution
rises high
enough to begin to affect the fertility of the land. At the same time
land
erosion increases. Total food production begins to fall after 2015.
That causes
the economy to shift more investment into the agriculture sector. But
agriculture has to compete for investment with a resource sector that
is also
beginning to sense some limits.
Between 1990 and 2020 in this scenario,
population
increases by 50% and industrial output by 85%. Therefore the
nonrenewable
resource use rate doubles. What was a 110-year supply of nonrenewable
resources
in 1990 is only a 30-year supply in 2020. So many resources have been
used that
much more capital and energy are required to find, extract, and refine
what remains.
As both food and nonrenewable resources become
harder to
obtain in this simulated world, capital is diverted to producing more
of them.
That leaves less output to be invested in capital growth. Finally the
industrial capital plant begins to decline, taking with it the service
and
agricultural sectors. For a short time the situation is especially
serious, as
population keeps rising, because of lags inherent in the age structure
and in
the process of social adjustment. Finally population too begins to
decrease, as
the death rate is driven upward by lack of food and health services.
This scenario is not a prediction, but
we believe
it is a possibility, one among many. Another very different possibility
is
shown in Scenario 10. To produce it we introduce technical, social, and
economic measures quite different from those that are currently being
pursued
in the world. That is the purpose of a model, not to predict, but to
test
"what if" possibilities.

In Scenario 10 people in the simulated world
decide on an
average family size of two starting in 1995, and they have available
effective
birth control technologies. They also set themselves a consumption
limit. When
every family attains roughly the material standard of living of
present-day Europe, it says "enough" and turns its attention to
achieving other, nonmaterial
goals. Furthermore, starting in 1995, this world puts a high priority
on
developing and implementing technologies that increase the efficiency
of
resource use, decrease pollution emissions, control land erosion, and
increase
land yields.
We assume in Scenario 10 that these technologies
come on
only when needed and only after a development delay of 20 years, and
that they
have a capital cost. The capital is available for them, however,
because in
this restrained society, capital does not have to support rapid growth
or to
ameliorate a spiraling set of problems caused by growth. By the end of
the
twenty-first century in this scenario, the new technologies reduce
nonrenewable
resource use per unit of industrial out-put by 80% and pollution
production per
unit of output by 90%. Land yield declines slightly in the early
twenty-first
century as pollution rises (a delayed effect of pollution emissions
around the
end of the twentieth century), but by 2040 pollution begins to go down
again.
Land yield recovers and rises slowly for the rest of the century.
The population in Scenario 10 levels off at just
under 8
billion and lives at its desired material standard of living for at
least a
century. Average life expectancy stays at just over 80 years, services
per
capita rise 210% above their 1990 levels, and there is sufficient food
for
everyone. Pollution peaks and falls before it causes irreversible
damage.
Nonrenewable resources deplete so slowly that half the original
endowment is
still present in the simulated year 2100.
We believe that the world could attain a
sustainable state
similar to that shown in Scenario 10. We think it is a picture not only
of a
feasible world, but of a desirable one, certainly more desirable than a
world
that keeps on growing until it is stopped by multiple crises.
Scenario 10 is not the only sustainable
outcome the
World3 model can produce. There are tradeoffs and choices. There could
be more
food and less industrial output or vice versa, more people living with
a
smaller stream of industrial goods or fewer people living with more.
The world
society could take more time to make the transition to equilibrium—but
it
cannot delay forever, or even very long. When we postpone for twenty
years the
policies that brought about the sustainable world of Scenario 10, the
population grows too large, pollution builds too high, resources are
drained
too much, and a collapse is no longer avoidable.
Beyond
the Limits and Still Growing
Physical expansion is still the dominant
behavior of
human society, though the resource base is declining.
In 1991 the human population was 5.4 billion. In
that year
the population grew by over 90 million people, a one-year addition
equivalent
to the total populations of Mexico plus Honduras, or to eight
Calcuttas. World
population is still growing exponentially. Under the most favorable
circumstances, the World Bank projects that the population will not
level off
until late in the next century, at 12.5 billion people.
Industrial production is also growing, more
rapidly than
the population. It has doubled over the past twenty years. Along with
it have
doubled, or more than doubled, the number of cars, the consumption of
coal and
natural gas, the electric generating capacity, the production of grain,
the
generation of garbage, the emissions of greenhouse gases. If the
economy were
to support 12.5 billion people, all living the way present North
Americans
live, it would have to expand at least twenty-fold—twenty more
industrial
worlds added to the existing one!
The industrial world that already exists is
using the
earth's resources unsustainably. It is not meeting the basic needs of
all the
world's people, and yet, given current knowledge and technology, all
needs
could be met without exceeding the earth's limits.
unnecessary,
wasteful consumption.
All over the earth soils, forests, surface
waters,
groundwaters, wetlands, and the diversity of nature are being degraded.
Even in
places where renewable resources appear to be stable, such as the
forests of
North America or the soils of Europe, the quality or health of the
resource is
in question. Deposits of fossil fuels and high-grade ores are being
drawn down.
There is no plan and no sufficient investment program to power the
industrial
economy after nonrenewable resources are gone. Pollutants are
accumulating;
their sinks are
overflowing. The
chemical
composition of the entire atmosphere is being changed.
If only one or a few resource stocks were
falling while
others were stable or rising, one might argue that growth could
continue by the
substitution of one resource for another. But when many stocks are
eroding and
many sinks are filling, there can be no doubt that human withdrawals of
material and energy have grown too far. They have overshot their
sustainable
limits.
The
Dynamics of Overshoot and Collapse

A growing population and economy can approach
the limits
to its physical carrying capacity in one of four ways.
external limits.
We submit that the human population and economy,
drawing
resources from a large but finite planet, forms a system that is
structured,
unless altered by human intelligence and human self-restraint, for
overshoot
and collapse. The prevailing industrial ethic is one of continuous
growth. The
resource base is both limited and erodable. The response of biological
and
geochemical systems to human abuse comes only after long delays. The
human
population acts only after further delay. And physical processes, from
human
population growth to forest growth to global climate change, operate
with
considerable momentum.
A population-economy-environment system that
contains
feedback delays and slow physical responses, thresholds and erosion is
literally unmanageable. No matter how brilliant its
technologies, no
matter how efficient its economy, no matter how wise its decision
makers, it
can't steer itself away from hazards, unless it does its best to look
far
forward and to test its limits very, very slowly. If it keeps its focus
only on
the short term and if it constantly tries to accelerate, it will
overshoot.
The advent of new technologies and the
flexibility of the
market system are no antidotes to overshoot, and they cannot by
themselves
prevent collapse. In fact they themselves operate with delays that enhance
the economy's tendency to overshoot. Technology and markets serve the
values of
society. If the primary goal is growth, they will produce growth,
overshoot,
and collapse. If the primary goals are equity and sustainability, then
technology and markets can also help bring about those goals.
Overshoot is a condition in which the delayed
signals from
the environment aren't yet strong enough to force an end to growth.
That means
that a society in overshoot still has a chance, if it acts quickly, to
bring
itself below its limits and avoid collapse.
There even may be a recent example of the human
world
doing just that in its response to the destruction of the ozone layer.
The
Ozone Layer:
Back from Beyond the Limits?
The ozone story illustrates all the ingredients
of an
overshoot and collapse system: exponential growth, an erodable
environmental
limit, and long response delays, both physical and political.
It took thirteen years from the first scientific
papers to
the signing of the Montreal Protocol. It will take thirteen more years
until
the Protocol, as strengthened in London, is fully implemented. The
chlorine
already in the stratosphere will remain there for more than a century.
In fall
1991 the Antarctic ozone hole was the deepest ever measured, and in
winter 1992
chlorine concentrations in the stratosphere over the Northern
Hemisphere were
the highest ever measured.
This is a story of overshoot and of a
remarkable,
worldwide human response. Whether or not it will be a story of collapse
depends
on how erodable or self-repairable the ozone layer is, on whether
future
atmospheric surprises appear, and on whether humanity has acted, and
will
continue to act, in time.
Six
Steps to Avoid Collapse
Six broad measures lead to the avoidance of
collapse in
the World3 model and, we believe, in the world. Each of them is
described here
in general terms. Each can be worked out in hundreds of specific ways
at all
levels, from households to communities to nations to the world as a
whole. Any
step in any of these directions is a step toward sustainability.
This last and most daunting step toward
sustainability
requires solutions to the pressing problems that underlie much of the
psychological and cultural commitment to growth: the problems of
poverty,
unemployment, and unmet nonmaterial needs. Growth as presently
structured is in
fact not solving those problems, or is solving them only slowly and
inefficiently. But until better solutions are in sight, society will
never let
go of its addiction to growth. Therefore there are three problems for
which
completely new thinking is urgently needed.
The
Sustainable
Society
A sustainable society is one that can persist
over
generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise
enough
not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support.
It is,
in the words of the World Commission on Environment and Development, a
society
that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of
future generations to meet their own needs."
In a sustainable society population, capital,
and
technology would be balanced so that the per capita material living
standard is
adequate and so that the society's material and energy throughputs meet
three
conditions:
A sustainable society is not necessarily a "zero
growth" society. That concept is as primitive as is the concept of
"perpetual growth." Rather a sustainable society would discriminate
among kinds of growth and purposes for growth. It would ask what growth
is for,
who would benefit, what it would cost, how long it would last, and
whether it
could be accommodated by the sources and sinks of the earth.
That is to say, a sustainable society would be
less
interested in growth than in development. As a recent
World Bank
report says: "Following the dictionary distinction... TO GROW means to
increase in size by the assimilation or accretion of materials. TO
DEVELOP
means to expand or realize the potentialities of; to bring to a fuller,
greater, or better state. When something grows it gets quantitatively
bigger;
when it develops it gets qualitatively better."
A sustainable society would not paralyze the
poor in their
poverty. To do so would not be sustainable for two reasons. First, the
poor
would not and should not stand for it. Second, keeping any part of the
population in poverty would not, except under dire coercive measures,
allow the
population to be stabilized. For both practical and moral reasons any
sustainable society would have to be just, fair, and equitable.
A sustainable society would not experience the
despondency
and stagnancy, high unemployment and bankruptcy that current market
systems
undergo when their growth is interrupted. The difference between the
transition
to a sustainable society and a present-day economic recession is like
the
difference between stopping an automobile with the brakes and stopping
it by
crashing into a brick wall. A deliberate transition to sustainability
would
take place slowly enough so that people and businesses could find their
proper
places in the new society.
There is no reason why a sustainable society
need be
technically or culturally primitive. Freed from both material anxiety
and
material greed, human society could have enormous possibilities for the
expansion of creativity.
A sustainable world need not be a rigid one, or
a
centrally controlled one. It would need rules, laws, standards,
boundaries, and
social agreements, of course, as does every human culture. Rules for
sustainability, like every workable social rule, would be put into
place not to
remove freedoms but to create them or to protect them against those who
would
destroy them. They could permit many more freedoms than would ever
be
possible in a world that continues to crowd against its limits.
Diversity is both a cause of and a result of
sustainability in nature, and therefore a sustainable human society
would be
diverse in both nature and culture.
A sustainable society could and should be
democratic,
evolving, technically advanced, and challenging. It would have plenty
of
problems to solve and plenty of ways for people to prove themselves, to
serve
each other, to realize their abilities, and to live good lives—perhaps
more
satisfying lives than any available today.
The
Next
Revolution
We don't underestimate the gravity of the
changes that
will take the present world down from overshoot and into
sustainability. We
think a transition to a sustainable world is technically and
economically
possible, but we know it is psychologically and politically daunting.
The
necessary changes would constitute a revolution, not in the sense of
the
American or French political revolutions, but in the much more profound
sense
of the Agricultural and Industrial Revolutions.
Like those revolutions, a sustainability
revolution would
change the face of the land and the foundations of human
self-definitions,
institutions, and cultures. It is not a revolution that can be planned
or
dictated. It won't follow a list of fiats from a government or from
computer
modelers. The sustainability revolution, if it happens, will be organic
and
evolutionary. It will arise from the visions, insights, experiments,
and
actions of billions of people. It will require every human quality and
skill,
from technical ingenuity, economic entrepreneurism, and political
leadership to
honesty, compassion, and love.
Are any of the necessary changes, from resource
efficiency
to human compassion, really possible? Can the world actually ease down
below
the limits and avoid collapse? Is there time? Is there enough money,
technology, freedom, vision, community, responsibility, foresight,
discipline,
and love on a global scale?
The general cynicism of the day would say
there's not a
chance. That cynicism, of course, is a mental model. The truth is that
no one
knows.
The world faces not a preordained future, but a
choice.
The choice is between models. One model says that this finite world for
all
practical purposes has no limits. Choosing that model will take us even
further
beyond the limits, and, we believe, to collapse within the next half
century.
Another model says that the limits are real and
close, and
that there is not enough time and that people cannot be moderate or
responsible
or compassionate. That model is self-fulfilling. If we choose to
believe it, we
will get to be right.
A third model says that the limits are real and
close, and
there is just exactly enough time, with no time to waste. There is just
exactly
enough energy, enough material, enough money, enough environmental
resilience,
and enough human virtue to bring about a revolution to a better world.
That model might be wrong. All the evidence we
have seen,
from the world data to the global computer models, suggests that it
might be
right. There is no way of knowing for sure, other than to try it.
